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AND ITS CON-

TROLLED AFFILIATE To ALLOCATE MORE THAN PROPORTIONATE SHARE
OF TAX SAVING TO DOMINANT CORPORATION VIOLATES ITS FIDUCIARY
DUTY TO MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OF AFFILIATE.

Case v. New York Cent. R.R. (N.Y. 1963)
The defendant, New York Central Railroad Company (hereinafter
called Central), owned a majority of the stock in the Mahoning Coal Railroad Company (hereinafter called Mahoning). In 1957, Central increased
its holdings in Mahoning to eighty per cent in order to qualify under
current tax law' to file a consolidated return with Mahoning. Then, by
reason of its control, it caused Mahoning to enter a contract with it by
which any tax savings accruing to Mahoning as a result of the consolidated
return would be allocated in the proportion of ninety three per cent to
2
Central and seven per cent to Mahoning. The minority stockholders of
Mahoning brought suit claiming a violation of the fiduciary duties owed
them by Central as majority stockholder.
The relief sought by the plaintiffs was rescission of the allocation
agreement and an accounting of all moneys received by Central from
Mahoning pursuant to the contract for the tax years 1957-60. The
Appellate Division with two judges dissenting, reversed the lower court
and held the allocation agreement unfair and unenforceable against the
minority stockholders. It further directed the defendant to account for all
moneys received under the agreement. Case v. New York Cent. R.R ...........
243 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1963).
App.Div ...........
The court, in holding this agreement invalid, found that there was
a fiduciary relationship between Central, as majority stockholder in
Mahoning, and the plaintiffs as minority stockholders, which required
fairness in dealings between the affiliates. It cited scant precedent in the
1.INT. Rxv. Cooz or 1954, §§ 1501-04.
2. Since 1884, Central had owned a majority of the stock of Mahoning and had
been the lessee of Mahoning's railroad under an agreement by which Central paid all
maintenance and operating expenses of the railroad and, in addition, paid to Mahoning
40% of gross earnings. In 1957, Central acquired additional stock of Mahoning in
order to qualify Mahoning as an "affiliate" under the 1954 revision of the Internal
Revenue Code (Ibid.) and allow it to file a consolidated return, thus permitting
Mahoning's net profits to be setoff against Central's net losses.
Had Mahoning filed separate returns for the years in question, 1957-1960, its
total tax liability would have been $3,825,717.43. The filing of consolidated returns
caused Mahoning's net profits to be totally offset by Central's losses and effected a
saving of the entire tax liability. The agreement in dispute here, provided for distribution of this tax saving, and by its terms, the sum of $3,556,992.15, or approxiinately 93%, was allocated to Central. The balance of the tax saving, $268,725.28, or
7%, was the net saving to Mahoning. This saving then, in theory, became a
potential dividend to the stockholders of Mahoning which gave the 20% minority
stockholders a dividend expectancy of $53,751.05, or approximately 1.5%, of the
original tax saving, and gave to Central, as 80% stockholders, $3,771,966.38, or 98.5%
of the total tax savings. It is because of this disproportionate distribution of
Mahoning's tax saving that the minority stockholders allege a breach of fiduciary
duty by Central as controlling majority stockholders.
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particular field of allocation of tax savings. Western Pac. R.R. v. Western
Pac. R.R. 3 had settled the proposition that, in the absence of agreement, the
tax saving would fall where it may. That case, however, did not involve
any agreement and could not answer the problem presented here. The
only case cited which did involve an agreement to allocate tax savings to
one other than the one benefited by it was Alleigro v. Pan American Bank.4
That case also involved a parent and subsidiary corporation. The court
there held the agreement invalid, but on the theory that the allocation
represented a preferential dividend which was not ratified by the stockholders. The court in the instant case did not reach that question and
stated that it was unnecessary to do so. The avoidance of that problem
seems to be correct. The basic question is whether such an agreement
between affiliates is fair. Although a finding that any money transferred
under such an agreement is in fact a preferential dividend would a fortiori
require a finding that the agreement was unfair, if it is found unfair on
the more general ground of fiduciary duty, as it was here, it is logically
unnecessary to proceed further.
The basic problem of fairness is best highlighted by the dissenting
opinion. It argues that since Mahoning would have paid all the money to
the federal government as tax liability, the savings, "whatever percentage, . . .represents income that Mahoning's minority stockholders would
never have realized had there been no agreement." 5 The point the opinion
makes is simply, if there is no injury, but in fact benefit to Mahoning,
how can the contract be unfair? To understand why the simplicity of this
argument may entrap the unwary, it is necessary to examine first how the
fiduciary duty is created and the burdens it imposes.
Generally, a fiduciary relationship arises in those cases in. which one
holds a position of superiority and influence over the interest of another
so that the latter is forced to rely upon the good faith and fair dealings of
the former. 6 The law gives the majority shareholders the right to control,
but requires that those who have this control act with the utmost good
faith.7 Thus where the majority control causes the corporation to enter a
profitable transaction, the minority may not be excluded from a fair participation in the fruits of the deal. 8
3. 197 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1951).
4.149 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1963).

5. Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 243 N.Y.S.2d 620, 626 (App. Div. 1963).

6. Schweickhardt v. Chessen, 329 Ill. 637, 161 N.E. 118 (1928) ; Small v. Nelson,
137 Me. 178, 16 A.2d 473 (1940).
7.InAllied Chem. & Dye Corp. v.Steel & Tube Co., 14 DOI. Ch. 1,120 Atl. 486
(1923), the court said:
The same considerations of fundamental justice which impose a fiduciary
character upon the relationship of the directors to the stockholders will also
impose . . .a like character upon the relationship which the majority of the
stockholders bear to the minority. . . . Unless the majority in such case are to
be regarded as owing a duty to the minority such as is owed by the directors
to all, then the minority are in a situation that exposes them to the grossest
frauds and subjects them to most outrageous wrongs.
Id. at 12-13, 120 Ati. at 491.
8. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 488, 39 S.Ct. 533, 535 (1918).
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In Case, Central, as majority stockholder of Mahoning, had nominated
all directors, of whom five were officials of Central and one an official of
one of its other subsidiaries. Where one corporation controls another by
holding a majority of the stock, and elects its own employees to control
the board of directors, contracts between the two corporations must be
regarded as if between a corporation and its directors, and should be
governed by the same principles.9 The general rule seems to be that such
transactions are subject to the careful and close scrutiny of the courts, 10
and according to the weight of authority such contracts will be set aside
unless they are fair and reasonable."
The dissent recognizes the nature of the relation when it says "that
the agreement was one made by Central with itself,' 2 but it fails to apply
the standard demanded. The traditional bargaining mechanism of the
market place which determines values to be received in the normal agreement is obviously not present in dealings between a dominant and a dominated corporation. The courts attempt to compensate for the balance
acquired in the free market by inserting the fairness test. Although this
test affords the fiduciary more latitude than the strict duties of the trustee
which prohibits any self-dealing 3 it still provides a constant reminder to
directors, officers and majority stockholders that the minority interests
will be protected when equity requires.
The essence of the test of fairness is whether or not, under all the
circumstances, the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length
bargain.' 4 Thus, while all contracts between a dominant and a dominated
corporation are not void, the element of fairness must be present. The
majority in Case recognizes that "there cannot be effective independent
bargaining among affiliates,"' and applied the proper test when it held that
Central, as majority stockholder, owed a duty of fairness in its dealings
with Mahoning.
The defendant argues that it was only through Central's independent
decision to make increased investment in additional stock and its consent
to file a consolidated return that a tax saving was realized. The apparent
thrust of this argument was that the contract was based on adequate
consideration and thus should be enforceable. Even assuming this issue
to be arguable in spite of the fairness required, the majority adequately and
logically answers this argument by saying that "this was not an act of
9. Ripley v. International Rys., 8 N.Y.2d 430, 436, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289, 292 (1960) ;
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 195-96, 123 N.E. 148, 151-52
(1919) ; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. New York & No. R.R., 150 N.Y. 410, 429-30,

44 N.E. 1043, 1048-49 (1896).
10. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 60 S.Ct. 238 (1939); Twin-Lick Oil Co. v.
Marbury, 91 U.S. 328 (1875).
11. Montgomery Traction Co. v. Harmon, 140 Ala. 505, 37 So. 371 (1904).
12. Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 243 N.Y.S.2d 620, 626 (App. Div. 1963).
13.

RESTATVMVNT (StcoND), TRUSTS

§ 170, comment b; § 206 (1959).

14. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07, 60 S.Ct. 238, 245 (1939).
15. Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 243 N.Y.S.2d 620, 623 (App. Div. 1963).
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Central that was a matter of free choice."' 16 They express the view that,
in the light of the obvious saving to the affiliated corporations, Central had
a "duty" to qualify Mahoning by increasing its investment in stock up to
eighty per cent. 17 The majority thus relies on the well-recognized principle
that a pre-existing duty will not support a new promise and, therefore, the
contract is void for lack of consideration. However, even if the court had
reached the opposite conclusion on this issue, the most important and
determinative issue here was whether the contract was fair.
Case was a unique situation which was the product of the Internal
Revenue Code provisions "permitting" affiliated corporations to file consolidated returns.' 8 These provisions recognize the realities of big business
and allow a large corporate complex to file income tax returns as one
unit. The Code provisions contain an inherent ambiguity in requiring the
"consent" of each corporation in an affiliated group,' 9 and on the other hand,
20
in specifying eighty per cent ownership of the subsidiary by the parent.
The requirement of consent by both parties gives some weight to Central's position that the contract was fair, and to Mr. Justice Jackson's argu2
ment in his dissenting opinion in Western Pac.R.R. v. Western Pac. R.R. 1
Jackson argued that the loss corporation had a right to ask for compensation for the use of its loss privilege and said "indeed, it is probable that
the intention of the statute . . . was to provide salvage for the loser, not
profit for one which sustained no loss." ' 22 The argument can then be made

that the consent requirement would have permitted Central to refuse to
allow Mahoning the benefit of its tax loss.
However, there is an intrinsic fallacy in the argument as used
here. The Code clearly calls for eighty per cent ownership. 23 This factor
plus the realities of corporate organization make it clear that the decision
as to Mahoning's consent was made only by the dominant corporation, and
the subsidiary's "consent" was automatic. Central's consent was compelled
by its duty to the affiliate. Thus, while automatic consent may be sufficient
to meet the standard of the tax provision, it has no bearing on collateral
allocation agreements. Given the fiduciary duty of Central, the court
simply determined that the contract was unfair and void.
There is an apparent dearth of authority concerning the effects of
consolidated returns on the rights of the stockholder. The federal tax
provisions involved clearly provide no answer since they merely allow
certain advantages if a corporate complex so organizes itself to meet the
16. Id. at 624.
17. The additional investment of $1,000,000 is hardly significant in proportion to
the tax saving of $3,825,717.43 over the period 1957-1960.
18. INT. RXv. CODe OF 1954, §§ 1501-04.
19. INT. Rev. CODS oP 1954, § 1501.
20. INT. Rzv. CODS OF 1954, § 1504(a) (1).
21. 345 U.S. 247, 73 S.Ct. 656 (1953). The majority opinion in this case was
involved only with procedural aspects. It did not disturb the holding of the lower
court on the merits. Western Pac. R.R. v. Western Pac. R.R., 197 F.2d 994 (9th
Cir. 1951).
22. Id. at 277, 73 S.Ct. at 671. 5
23. INT. Rrv. CODt OF 1954, § 1 04(a) (1).
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